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Applying a spatial competition model to banking, we analyze the
eﬀects of the choice of a monetary policy rule by the central bank on
banks’ market power as measured by the Lerner index. We show that
a procyclical monetary policy may reinforce the countercyclical move-
ment of the Lerner index. That is, this measure of competitiveness of
the banking sector may vary more over the business cycle due to the
monetary policy rule.
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icy.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the eﬀects of monetary policy on the competi-
tiveness of the banking sector. We argue that the policy rate, and therefore
monetary policy in general, aﬀects competition among banks. We show that
with a procyclical monetary policy (where the bank increases the policy rate
in good states, and decreases it in bad states), bank competitiveness may
vary more over the business cycle.
We present a two-stage model in which the central bank sets the policy rate
in the ﬁrst stage, according to a speciﬁc type of interest-rate setting rule. In
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1the second stage, there is competition among banks on the loan market. We
focus on a policy rule that concentrates strictly on output stabilization. The
feedback coeﬃcient, which describes the size of the policy rate adjustment
relative to the deviation of output from the natural or steady state level, is
left unspeciﬁed. Thus, the central bank is assumed to stabilize output only
to some, unspeciﬁed, degree. The resulting interest rate setting rule is a
function of an economy-wide shock. For any given realization of the shock,
which aﬀects output, the policy rule speciﬁes the rate the central bank wishes
to set in order to (partially) stabilize output. The second stage of the model
describes competition among banks in terms of a spatial competition model
with horizontally diﬀerentiated products. Here, the policy rate set by the
central bank performs the role of marginal cost to the banks (assuming
zero marginal management costs). The number of banks is assumed to be
exogenously given and ﬁxed. The second-stage equilibrium therefore simply
describes the optimal lending rate as charged by the banks, given the policy
rate set by the central bank in the ﬁrst stage.
Using a comparative statics approach, this model allows us to analyze the
eﬀects of diﬀerent values of the policy rate, and therefore of diﬀerent mon-
etary policy rules (in terms of the size of the feedback coeﬃcient), on the
equilibrium lending rate. Evidently, lending rates will vary with the policy
rate, since the latter is marginal cost. However, we are not interested in
the level of the lending rate per se, but in the market power of the banks
(focusing on the loan market). Note that market power is not the same
thing as market structure. For example, a monopolist does not necessarily
have market power if there is a strong threat of entry. For that reason we
interpret market power as the ability to charge a price above marginal cost.
This can be measured by the relative markup of price over marginal cost,
the Lerner (1934) index, deﬁned as
Lerner index =
price − marginal cost
price
.
In our banking model this should be read as
Lerner index =
lending rate − policy rate
lending rate
.
Corts (1999, p. 227) argues that the markup is the ‘natural measure of a
market’s competitiveness’. He also mentions that because marginal cost in
reality is usually not directly observable, many empirical studies use other
2measures to assess market power, for example conjectural variations. How-
ever, in our theoretical model marginal cost evidently is observable, and we
can use the Lerner index to assess the competitiveness of the banking sec-
tor. Note that the value of the Lerner index can generally be aﬀected by
changes in the number of ﬁrms active in the market, or demand changes.
In our theoretical model we therefore keep the number of banks as well as
the demand for bank loans ﬁxed, in order to concentrate on the eﬀects of
monetary policy.
Our results show that the lending rate as well as the markup or spread
(lending rate minus policy rate) is increasing in the policy rate, and the
Lerner index is decreasing in the policy rate. The latter result implies that in
the context of our model a procyclical monetary policy has a countercyclical
eﬀect on the Lerner index.1 We show that this measure of market power
in banking may vary more over the business cycle due to the monetary
policy rule. In reality the number of banks as well as demand may of course
change over the business cycle, blurring these eﬀects. However, we conclude
that the interest rate setting rule used by the central bank may aﬀect the
observed market power of banks. Evidently, this has important implications
for competition policy with respect to the banking sector. Also, it suggests
that empirical estimates of market power in banking should be interpreted
carefully. Observed changes in such estimates may not be a consequence of
changes in bank behavior but might be caused by changes in the policy rate
implemented by the central bank.
In a sense, we consider here a microeconomic approach to monetary trans-
mission, or more precisely to the pass through of changes in the policy rate
to bank lending rates. Clearly, this approach has its limitations since mon-
etary policy goals have a macroeconomic nature. Thus, the analysis here
should be interpreted as a partial analysis, where the focus is on how changes
in the policy rate may aﬀect bank lending rates. There is a large gap be-
tween the theoretical, microeconomic literature on market imperfections in
banking and the mainly macroeconomic analyses of monetary transmission.
In most empirical studies of the pass through of policy rate adjustments
only lip service is paid to the micro side (see e.g. Cottarelli and Kourelis,
1994; BIS, 1994; Borio and Fritz, 1995; Mojon, 2000; Sander and Kleimeier,
2001; Toolsema et al., 2001; and Hofmann, 2002). Microeconomic studies
1We use the term procyclical to refer to a movement in the same direction as that
of the business cycle (e.g. the policy rule is procyclical since the policy rate increases in
booms), and the term countercyclical to refer to a movement in opposite direction (e.g.
the Lerner index moves countercyclically since it falls in good states).
3of monetary transmission in the context of imperfect competition models of
banking have remained limited in number (for an overview of such studies
see Swank, 1994, section 2.4.3; see also Swank, 1994, chapter 3). Probably
this is due to the partial nature of such research, as discussed above. In this
paper we aim to ﬁll part of this gap by analyzing the eﬀects of monetary
policy on lending rates and the relative markup (Lerner index) of banks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section
discusses some related literature. Section 3 gives the basic setup of the
model. It describes the monetary policy of the central bank and presents
a simple model of competition for the banking sector based on the Salop
model. Section 4 derives the solution of the model. In section 5 we turn to
the eﬀects of monetary policy in this model. In particular, we examine the
eﬀects of the monetary policy rule used by the central bank on market power
in banking as measured by the Lerner index. We show that a procyclical
monetary policy has a countercyclical eﬀect on the Lerner index. Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature review
In this paper we focus on the eﬀects of monetary policy on bank behav-
ior. The existing literature on the relationship between monetary policy
and bank competition has focused mainly on the other direction of causal-
ity, however. Several authors have studied the eﬀects of bank competition
or bank market structure on monetary policy, i.e. on the eﬀectiveness of
monetary policy and the optimal choice of policy targets and instruments.
For example, Aftalion and White (1977) compare perfect competition versus
pure monopoly in banking, and analyze the responsiveness of the banking
system to various monetary policy tools, focusing on the European type of
monetary system. VanHoose (1983) uses a similar approach based on US
market conditions and monetary policy procedures. VanHoose (1985) uses
the more general assumption of Cournot competition among ﬁnancial insti-
tutions and considers a change in the number of banks. In general, these
studies conclude that bank market structure may aﬀect monetary control
and inﬂuence the appropriate choice of monetary policy targets and instru-
ments.
The issue that monetary policy may aﬀect the competitiveness of banks was
raised by Bagliano et al. (2000). They examine the possible eﬀects of the
monetary policy rule chosen by the European Central Bank (ECB) on bank
4competition in the context of pricing behavior of banks over the business
cycle. They describe monetary policy by an interest rate setting rule that can
have a procyclical2 component. Using a model of implicit collusion based on
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Bagliano et al. (2000) discuss the eﬀects of
the choice of a monetary policy rule by the central bank on collusion and the
incentive of banks to set high lending rates over the business cycle. They
conclude that a procyclical monetary policy may favor implicit collusion.
This implies that the adoption of the ECB’s common monetary policy itself
will result in changes in the competitiveness of the national banking sectors.
The changes may be diﬀerent across countries. The precise eﬀects depend
on the degree of procyclicality of the national monetary policy before the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as compared to that of the ECB’s
policy (with respect to that particular country’s business cycle).
In our model we use a similar interest rate setting rule to study the eﬀects of
m o n e t a r yp o l i c yo nb a n kc o m p e t i t i o n .H o w e v e r ,w eu s ead i ﬀerent model of
competition, based on horizontal product diﬀerentiation. In the particular
model of Bagliano et al. (2000) there are only two states of the world (high
demand and low demand, respectively), and there is always full collusion
in bad states, independent of the central bank’s policy rule. The choice
of policy rule therefore only aﬀects bank competitiveness in good states. In
contrast, we present a model in which monetary policy aﬀects bank behavior
both in good states and in bad states (where our deﬁnition of the states is
somewhat diﬀerent from that of Bagliano et al., as explained in section 3
below).
The spatial competition model is based on the idea that with diﬀerentiated
products, the results of price competition among ﬁrms are less extreme than
in the standard Bertrand model. We use a popular spatial competition
model that was introduced by Salop (1979). In the original model, products
are diﬀerentiated because of geographical distance and transportation costs.
Alternatively, it can be interpreted in terms of heterogeneous goods, in which
case location refers to taste for a speciﬁc type of good. The model has been
applied to the banking sector by various authors, for example to assess the
optimal number of banks (Freixas and Rochet, 1997, pp. 67-73). Chiappori
et al. (1995) use it to study the consequences of deposit rate regulation.
They also examine the eﬀects of deposit rate regulation on the eﬀectiveness
of monetary policy. They show that monetary transmission is imperfect
under deposit regulation with tied-sales contracts (i.e. loans are granted
2Bagliano et al. (2000) refer to the monetary policy as countercyclical themselves, using
ad e ﬁnition that is diﬀerent from ours.
5under the condition that the borrower deposits his current account in the
same bank), in the sense that the response of the lending rate to the policy
rate is less than one to one in that case. However, they do not consider
the eﬀects of monetary policy on market power of banks. Schargrodsky
and Sturzenegger (2000) apply the Salop model to banking to show that
tighter capital requirements imply a lower degree of specialization, which
may induce more intense competition, i.e. lower spreads, which contradicts
the traditional prediction of a trade-oﬀ between solvency and competition.
3 The model
In order to investigate how policy rate adjustments aﬀect the lending rate
and the Lerner index, we present a two-stage model. In the ﬁrst stage
the central bank decides on the policy rate according to an interest rate
setting rule that describes monetary policy. In the second stage, the com-
mercial banks compete by setting interest rates for loans and lending to
entrepreneurs. This timing can be justiﬁed as follows. In the formal model,
banks compete for one period only (i.e. in stage 2). Informally, however,
we can think of banks competing for several, say T, periods. At the end
of period T, the central bank decides to adjust the short-term interest rate
for some reason (for example, after several periods of boom there will now
be a recession). After the new rate has been set, the banks compete again
for some time, until the central bank adjusts the interest rate again, etc.
This section starts with a short description of monetary policy (stage 1)
and proceeds with the model of bank competition (stage 2) which is based
on the Salop model of spatial competition.
In order to model policy rate adjustments we assume that the central bank
aims at (some degree of) output stabilization. As we will show below, this
implies that the central bank uses an interest rate rule of a speciﬁcf o r m .L e t
y denote the trend or steady-state output level, and y the current output
level. Output stabilization implies that the central bank sets the short-term
policy rate according to an interest rate setting rule of the form
i = i + φy (y − y),
where i refers to the steady-state interest rate and φy > 0 is a feedback
parameter. As we will show below, by increasing (decreasing) i the central
bank can decrease (increase) output y. Thus, by using this policy rule the
6central bank stabilizes output y around its natural level y to some (exoge-
nous) extent, indicated by the parameter φy. Note that central banks in
general are concerned with inﬂation as well. For example, the ECB primar-
ily aims at limited inﬂation. Only if that goal is achieved, the ECB might
consider taking measures to stabilize output. In contrast, the Federal Re-
serve (Fed) primarily aims at output stabilization (see e.g. Taylor, 1993).
In the present paper, we focus on output only, for expositional convenience.
Thus, our model presents a simpliﬁed view of monetary policy and is more
closely related to the case of the Fed than to the ECB’s policy. However,
if we assume that in the short run there is a positive correlation between
the output gap and the deviation of inﬂation from its expected level (like in
the Lucas, 1973, misperception model which is based on imperfect general
price information), the rule can also be interpreted to command a policy
rate increase if inﬂation is high.
With respect to the bank competition subgame of stage 2, consider a Salop
circular city of length 1 on which there is a unitary density of entrepreneurs
located uniformly along the circle. Entrepreneurs can undertake an invest-
ment project of ﬁxed size normalized to 1. In order to invest, they need to
borrow from a bank. There are n banks, located equidistantly along the cir-
cle. We let n be exogenous.3 We consider horizontal product diﬀerentiation
among banks, and assume each bank to oﬀer a single product only, i.e. loans
of a speciﬁct y p e .T h et y p eo fl o a no ﬀered by the bank is indicated by the
bank’s location on the circle. Thus, loans are heterogeneous among banks.
We interpret an entrepreneur’s location on the circle as the entrepreneur’s
taste for a speciﬁct y p eo fb a n k . A ne n t r e p r e n e u rl, located at distance
xlj from bank j,i sxlj away from his preferred type when borrowing from
bank j.L e tt be a taste parameter, which is the analog of a transportation
cost. Then, txlj expresses (the monetary equivalent of) the entrepreneur’s
decrease in utility from obtaining a loan from bank j instead of borrowing
from his preferred type of bank.
Generally, the deposit rate closely follows the money market or policy rate.
Therefore, we use the common assumption that each bank faces an inﬁnitely
3In an earlier version of this paper that was circulated under a diﬀerent title (Toolsema,
2001) we analyze the case of endogenous n. There we have a three-stage model. In an
intermediate stage, after the central bank determines the policy rate but before the banks
compete by setting lending rates, the commercial banks decide whether or not to be active
in the market. That is, the number of banks n is endogenously determined in this stage,
and we examine the eﬀects of diﬀerent monetary policy rules on the equilibrium value of
n.
7elastic deposit supply at the nominal short-term interest rate i. In stage 2,
the n banks decide on the interest rates on loans rj, j =1 ,...,n. Then,
each entrepreneur borrows from the bank he prefers. After obtaining loans,
entrepreneurs are subject to an economy-wide shock. Finally, total repay-
ments obtained by the bank depend on the shock and are used to repay
depositors.
Again consider entrepreneur l, located at distance xlj from bank j.W i t h -
out the shock, by borrowing from bank j and investing the loan, this en-
trepreneur obtains a net return equal to
Slj = V − rj − txlj,
where V denotes the gross return on the investment project. Note that Slj
denotes the net return generated by the investment, corrected for the costs
of obtaining the loan. We assume that for each entrepreneur l there is a
bank j such that Slj ≥ 0, and thus the market for loans is covered.
Economic conditions aﬀect the actual return. Sometimes, this is modeled
by letting the gross return V depend on economic conditions. However, for
expositional convenience, we take a diﬀerent approach. We assume that if
aggregate demand turns out to be low, some entrepreneurs will go bankrupt.
The economy-wide shock is therefore assumed to aﬀect the entrepreneurs’
return in the following way. Let s be uniformly distributed on the interval
(0,1). Suppose that for a given realization s of the shock a fraction 1 − s
of the entrepreneurs (selected randomly) goes bankrupt. We assume that
the entrepreneurs have limited liability and no collateral. Thus, if an en-
trepreneur goes bankrupt, he does not repay the principal nor the interest,
and ends up with a payoﬀ of zero. Therefore, for a given shock 0 <s<1,
entrepreneur l’s expected net return generated by the investment is given by
sSlj = s(V − rj − txlj).
This can be interpreted as the expected value of net return for given eco-
nomic conditions. We assume that the realization of the shock becomes
known before stage 1, so that the central bank can respond to it by adjust-
ing the policy rate i in order to stabilize output. For simplicity, we set the
size of the shock s associated with the natural output level y at s = 1
2.
As an alternative speciﬁcation, we could interpret the term txlj as trans-
portation costs that are sunk once the entrepreneur has obtained a loan.
Whether the entrepreneur goes bankrupt or not, he incurs these costs. In
that case the expected net return should be written as
s(V − rj) − txlj.
8That is, if the entrepreneur goes bankrupt, he ends up with a payoﬀ equal
to −txlj. Assuming that for each entrepreneur l there is a bank j such that
this expected net return is nonnegative, this leads to qualitatively the same
results, as will be illustrated below.
4 Solution of the model
In order to solve for the equilibrium of the model, we apply backward induc-
tion. Starting with stage 2, we take the short-term interest rate i as given.
The distance between two adjacent banks is given by 1
n.T h e i n d i ﬀerent
entrepreneur between two adjacent banks j and k is therefore located at a
distance e xjk from bank j such that













The assumption that the market is covered can thus be written as V −rj −
te xjk ≥ 0 for all adjacent banks j,k. Assuming symmetry among banks, all
banks other than j will set the same lending rate r−j, and total demand
faced by bank j when it sets rate rj is given by
Dj (rj,r −j)=2 e x =




Evidently, with the speciﬁcation of the shock to entrepreneurs’ net return
as described in the previous section, the shock s will also aﬀect the banks’
earnings. A fraction 1−s of entrepreneurs goes bankrupt and does not repay
anything, whereas the remaining fraction s is able to repay the entire loan
plus interest. Bank j’s proﬁts are given by
πj = s(1 + rj)Dj (·) − (1 + i)Dj (·).
Each bank j maximizes proﬁts πj with respect to rj,t a k i n gi as given. Solv-
ing this maximization problem and imposing symmetry we ﬁnd the equilib-








9It can easily be veriﬁed that the second-order condition for a maximum is
satisﬁed. Bank j’s proﬁts in equilibrium are given by
π∗ = s(1 + r∗)
1
n




















Note that banks’ proﬁts are independent of the policy rate i.O n l y t h e
entrepreneurs’ expected payoﬀ is inﬂuenced by the policy rate.
Now we turn to stage 1. In this stage, the central bank sets a policy rate,
stabilizing output towards its natural level. The central bank realizes that
expected4 total output (or total income) of the entrepreneurs at the end of
stage 2 is given by the integral of the expected net return of all entrepreneurs,






(V − r∗ − txlj)dl ≡ sI.
We use I to denote the integral
U 1
l=0 Sljdl. Note that the subscript lj of
x should be interpreted here as referring to entrepreneur l who visits his














The integral I = I (r∗(i)) is a decreasing function of r∗, so it is a decreasing
function of i. Now we can derive the explicit policy rule followed by the
central bank in the setting of this output speciﬁcation.
The central bank is assumed to aim at stabilizing output (to some exogenous









.I n t u i t i v e l y ,i n c a s e o f a
shock s>1
2 that causes output to be relatively high ceteris paribus,5 the
central bank sets i>i, reducing I and thereby reducing output towards y.
In case of a shock s<1
2 that causes output to be low, the central bank sets
4We refer to expected output here, because although s is assumed to be known, it is
uncertain which entrepreneurs will go bankrupt. Only the fraction of entrepreneurs that
will go bankrupt is known.
5Note that I also depends on s,v i ar
∗. However, ∂r
∗/∂s<0s o∂I/∂s>0, and indeed
as h o c ks>1/2 causes output y = s(I + t/n) to be relatively high..
10i<i, stimulating output. More precisely, the optimal monetary policy from
the point of view of a central bank aiming at output stabilization (to some
extent) can be described in terms of the shock s by the interest rate setting
rule
i = i[1 + φ(2s − 1)], (2)
where φ > 0, s refers to the economy-wide shock and i denotes the ‘average’
or steady-state short-term interest rate. The parameter φ is a feedback
coeﬃcient (related to the coeﬃcient φy in the discussion above), indicating
to what extent the central bank stabilizes output. This policy rule describes
the central bank’s equilibrium strategy. We assume φ < 1i no r d e rt oa v o i d
negative policy rates. Observe that the central bank moves the short-term
interest rate i procyclically since φ > 0: in good states of the world, i.e. for
1
2 <s<1, φ(2s − 1) is positive, whereas in bad states, where 0 <s<1
2,
this term is negative. Writing the monetary policy rule in this way, the
central bank’s policy rule is related directly to the level of s instead of y.
The reason is that ﬂuctuations in y (apart from those caused by the central
bank’s policy) are determined solely by the economy-wide shock s in our
setup. In the ﬁrst stage of the model the central bank observes the value of
s, realizes how this will aﬀect y in the second stage, and adjusts the policy
rate i accordingly.
Note that in this framework the central bank does not choose a speciﬁc
strategy in order to maximize some explicit payoﬀ function. Instead, the
description of central bank behavior is more general and does not specify
the degree of procyclicality (say, the amplitude of the procyclical movement)
of monetary policy explicitly. This more general speciﬁcation allows us to
examine the eﬀects of diﬀerent monetary policy rules on the degree of market
power in the banking sector. Alternatively, the framework can be interpreted
as follows. The primary aim of the central bank in our model is to stabilize
output to a certain, given degree. This uniquely determines the policy rule
(i.e. the feedback coeﬃcient φ). In following this particular policy, the
central bank does not take into account the eﬀects of the monetary policy
on banks’ market power. However, as will argue below, such eﬀects do exist.
This has important implications for competition policy for banks.
5E ﬀects of monetary policy
We will now apply a comparative statics approach in order to analyze the
eﬀects of changes in the policy rate and of diﬀerent monetary policy rules
11(in terms of the size of the feedback coeﬃcient φ) on the equilibrium lending
rate and the Lerner index. We ﬁrst concentrate on the eﬀects of changes
in the policy rate i. Then, we turn to an analysis of the eﬀects of diﬀerent
monetary policy rules and study the eﬀects of diﬀerent feedback coeﬃcients
φ.
Lemma 1 For given s, the equilibrium lending rate is positively related to
the policy rate. In fact, we have dr∗
di > 1 (for given s).
Proof The proof follows directly from (1): dr∗
di = 1
s > 1. 
The interpretation of this lemma is straightforward. The equilibrium lending
rate set by the bank is increasing in the policy rate determined by the central
bank. The policy rate i in our model represents the marginal cost of a bank.
The lemma thus states that the price set by the bank is increasing in the




di − 1 > 0.
In this paper our aim is to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent monetary policy
rules (that is, diﬀerent feedback coeﬃcients) on the degree of competition
among banks. Therefore, we now examine the eﬀect of the central bank’s
policy rate i on the Lerner index of the commercial banks. In our model,




























ns − n − ts
(−ts + ns − n − ni)
2.
Since ns − n must be negative, the numerator is negative, and we conclude
that dL
di < 0. 
12From this lemma we see that the policy rate i set by the central bank aﬀects
the market power of the commercial banks as measured by the Lerner index.
If the central bank lowers the policy rate, the banks get more market power
in the sense that they can set a higher relative markup. So, a change in
the policy rate in our model does not only aﬀect aggregate output but the
competitiveness of the banking sector as well.
It is true that lemma 2 only shows that the Lerner index is downward sloping
in marginal cost in this particular model, but the result is far more general.
For example, it holds for the standard linear symmetric Cournot model with
n ﬁrms (or banks) as well. This can be seen as follows. Let demand be given
by p = a − bQ where p refers to price and Q to total output of the n ﬁrms;
a and b are parameters. Marginal cost equals c. Then in equilibrium an
























Thus, in the Cournot model the Lerner index is downward sloping in marginal
cost. Note that a similar result holds for the case of a monopolist (n =1 ) .
This result corresponds to our lemma 2, and suggests that our conclusions
with respect to the eﬀect of monetary policy on banks’ market power are
not limited to the precise model speciﬁcation applied here, but are more
general.
Intuitively, the Lerner index varies with the policy rate i, or with marginal
cost c in general, because there is no ﬁxed markup. Suppose that the Lerner









is a ﬁxed markup. In reality, as well as in many models of competition,
there is no ﬁxed markup of price over marginal cost, and the Lerner index
will vary with marginal cost. Applying this result to the case of banks and
interpreting the policy rate set by the central bank as marginal cost, we
conclude that monetary policy aﬀects the Lerner index.
Bank j’s proﬁts in equilibrium are given by π∗ = st
n2.This shows that bank’s
proﬁts are independent of the policy rate i. So, summarizing, an increase in
the policy rate increases the lending rate as well as the spread, decreases in
the Lerner index, and leaves the banks’ proﬁts unaﬀected.
Using the alternative speciﬁcation of an entrepreneur’s expected net return
given by
s(V − rj) − txlj,



















ns − n − t
(ns− n − t − ni)
2,
which is again negative. Thus lemma’s 1 and 2 are valid in this speciﬁca-
tion as well. Finally, banks’ equilibrium proﬁts are π∗ = t
n2 and are again
independent of i.
We now turn to the comparative static eﬀects of a change in the feedback co-
eﬃcient φ. This analysis should be interpreted as the comparison of diﬀerent
monetary policy rules. That is, we analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent degrees of
procyclicality in the policy rate on lending rates and on the competitiveness
of the banking sector.
First note that we use the phrase ‘for given s’ in lemma’s 1 and 2, because
s itself also aﬀects r∗ and L. The ‘direct eﬀect’ of an increase in s (say, if
















So, if φ =0 ,r ∗ and L move countercyclically. Now consider the case φ > 0.
Proposition 1 For 1
2 <s<1, dr∗
dφ > 0 and dL




dφ ≥ 0.A n i n c r e a s e i nφ decreases the degree of countercyclicality of
r∗ and increases the degree of countercyclicality of L.
Proof Note that in (2) di
dφ > 0i fs>1
2,b u t di
dφ ≤ 0i fs ≤ 1
2.T o g e t h e r
with lemma’s 1 and 2, this proves the ﬁrst two sentences of the proposition.
From this, it easily follows that an increase in φ decreases the degree of
countercyclicality of r∗ and increases the degree of the countercyclicality of










which is negative, but larger than ∂r∗
∂s = −1+i
s2 . The diﬀerence between
the two expressions (in absolute value),
2iφ
s ,i si n c r e a s i n gi nφ.T h a ti s ,r∗
moves countercyclically, but the degree of countercyclicality (i.e. the degree


















2s2. Again, the diﬀerence between
the two expressions (in absolute value) is increasing in φ.S o ,L moves coun-
tercyclically, but the degree of countercyclicality (i.e. the degree to which L
responds to a change in s)i n c r e a s e si nφ. 
Proposition 1 shows that an increase in the degree of procyclicality of the
policy rule, φ, decreases the amplitude of the countercyclical movement of
r∗,and increases the amplitude of the countercyclical movement of L.T h a t
is, a procyclical monetary policy weakens the countercyclical movement of
r∗, whereas it reinforces that of L. A procyclical monetary policy rule thus
has a procyclical eﬀect on the lending rate. The reason is simply that the
central bank moves the policy rate procyclically, and this policy rate is
treated here as the marginal cost of the commercial banks. The price or
15lending rate set by the banks simply follows movements of this marginal
c o s t( n e x tt or e s p o n d i n gt oc h a n g e si ns directly). Furthermore, the propo-
sition indicates that the procyclical policy rule reinforces the countercyclical
movement in the degree of market power of commercial banks. Our hypoth-
esis is that an upward movement of the business cycle leads to a decrease in
market power6, in part via the higher policy rate set by the central bank.
Note that this proposition depends crucially on the results that dr∗
di > 0
and dL
di < 0b u tnot on the speciﬁc model of second-stage competition (for
example, we would obtain qualitatively the same eﬀects of monetary policy
with a simple linear symmetric Cournot model; see also the discussion of
that model above). It can be veriﬁed that the proposition also carries over
to our alternative speciﬁcation where the entrepreneur’s expected net return
is given by s(V − rj)−txlj instead of s(V − rj − txlj). Although the precise
expression for output y is slightly diﬀerent in that case, the monetary policy
rule is qualitatively the same. Since lemma’s 1 and 2 continue to hold in
this case, so does proposition 1.
Proposition 1 shows that a procyclical monetary policy (φ > 0) aﬀects the
lending rate as well as the degree of market power over the business cycle.
Inﬂuencing the lending rate can be seen as one of the aims of a procyclical
policy. However, we have shown that the Lerner index L is aﬀected as well,
and thus the competitiveness of the banking sector is varying (more) over
the business cycle with a procyclical policy rule. These hypotheses can be
related to those of Bagliano et al. (2000, proposition 5). In their model, an
increase in the degree of procyclicality φ leads to softer competition among
banks in good states. This contradicts our ﬁnding that dL
dφ < 0 for good
states (s>1
2). However, for s<1
2,w eﬁnd the opposite eﬀect of market
power increasing in φ whereas in the model of Bagliano et al. (2000) there
is always full collusion in bad states.
6 Conclusion
Applying the Salop spatial competition model to banking, we have analyzed
the eﬀects on bank competition of the choice of a monetary policy rule by
the central bank. We have shown that monetary policy may aﬀect the degree
of market power - as measured by the Lerner index - in the banking sector.
6Note that the result of less market power in good states corresponds to the Rotemberg-
Saloner result of price wars during booms (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986).
16This conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Bagliano et al. (2000), who apply a model of
implicit collusion to the banking sector. Although the precise eﬀects in their
model are diﬀerent from ours, we come to the same general conclusion that
monetary policy aﬀects the competitiveness of banks. In our theoretical
framework the level of the policy rate, which performs the role of marginal
cost, aﬀects the ability of banks to charge a lending rate above the policy
rate. When the policy rate increases, the Lerner index decreases (ceteris
paribus). Thus, according to our model the choice of a procyclical policy
rule reinforces the countercyclical movement of the degree of market power
in banking.
In our model the central bank’s only aim is to stabilize output (to some
degree). However, our results show that implementing policy rate changes
does not only aﬀect output but the competitiveness of banks as well. This
has important implications for competition policy for the banking sector. In
general, governments prefer well-functioning ﬁnancial markets. This involves
at r a d e - o ﬀ between the beneﬁts of competition in banking, and ﬁnancial
stability. However, taking into account the restrictions on bank competition
imposed by the desired level of stability, the government will generally prefer
competition in the banking sector to be as strong as possible. In our model,
we show that this preferred level may not be attained in practice, since
market power varies with the monetary policy rule followed by the central
bank. More precisely, in our model the central bank’s policy does aﬀect the
competitiveness of banks, but it does not aﬀect ﬁnancial stability. Thus,
the above analysis indicates that when the central bank follows a procyclical
monetary policy rule, the preferred level of competition cannot always be
achieved. This also implies that a high value of the Lerner index measured
at some point in time may not always be fully due to the abuse of market
power, e.g. collusion, by banks; it may partly be caused by the speciﬁc
interest rate setting rule applied by the central bank.
We conclude this paper with some possible directions for future research.
First, the speciﬁcation of monetary policy in our model assumes that the
central bank aims at output stabilization only. This is of course a simpliﬁca-
tion, because as we argued in the introduction to this paper, central banks
are concerned with a stable price level as well. The results of our model only
apply to policy rate adjustments implemented in order to stabilize output.
It would be interesting to analyze whether similar results can be obtained if
the main goal of the central bank is price stability. Ideally, a model should
be developed in which the monetary policy rule contains all possible aims
of a real-world central bank.
17In particular, developing such a model in which the central bank is primar-
ily concerned with price stability, and perhaps to some degree with output
stability as a secondary aim, may yield interesting insights for the case of
the ECB. If that speciﬁcation would also show that the monetary policy
rule aﬀects the competitiveness of banks, that would have important im-
plications for the national competition policies of the EMU countries, who
share a common monetary policy. For example, the parameter φy,w h i c h
can be interpreted as a feedback coeﬃcient with respect to the state of the
own economy, probably was high for Germany before EMU but relatively
low for the other EMU-members. The reason is that these other members
mainly had to adjust their monetary policy to the actions taken by the
Bundesbank following German shocks. The shift to EMU may imply an in-
crease in the feedback coeﬃcientφy for these other members, and a decrease
in φy for Germany. So, if our result that monetary policy aﬀects market
power in banking would carry over to the ECB case, this would predict that
the shift to EMU may have aﬀected the competitiveness of the various Eu-
ropean national banking sectors in diﬀerent ways. Also, it would suggest
that the ECB’s common monetary policy itself aﬀects bank competitiveness
diﬀerently across countries.
Second, we have proposed several hypothesis that could be tested empirically
in future research. For example, with a procyclical policy rule we predict a
negative relationship between the Lerner index and the business cycle, and
we argue that the Lerner index will respond more to the business cycle if
the policy rule is more procyclical, i.e. if the feedback coeﬃcient φy is larger.
For example, during a boom, the central bank will set a high policy rate.
The policy rate is higher if φy is larger. Our model predicts the Lerner index
to be low in that case, and lower if φy is larger. Empirical testing of these
hypotheses and possibly those of the extended model proposed above could
yield important insights into the relationship between monetary policy, the
pass through of policy rates to bank lending rates, and bank behavior.
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